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Abstract
Smart modular freight containers – as propagated in the Physical Internet paradigm – are
equipped with sensors, data storage capability and intelligence that enable them to route them-
selves from origin to destination without manual intervention or central governance. In this
self-organizing setting, containers can autonomously place bids on transport services in a spot
market setting. However, for individual containers it may be difficult to learn good bidding
policies due to limited observations. By sharing information and costs between one another,
smart containers can jointly learn bidding policies, even though simultaneously competing for
the same transport capacity. We replicate this behavior by learning stochastic bidding policies
in a semi-cooperative multi agent setting. To this end, we develop a reinforcement learning algo-
rithm based on the policy gradient framework. Numerical experiments show that sharing solely
bids and acceptance decisions leads to stable bidding policies. Additional system information
only marginally improves performance; individual job properties suffice to place appropriate
bids. Furthermore, we find that carriers may have incentives not to share information with
the smart containers. The experiments give rise to several directions for follow-up research,
in particular the interaction between smart containers and transport services in self-organizing
logistics.
1 Introduction
The logistics domain is increasingly moving towards self-organization, meaning that freight trans-
port is planned without direct human intervention. The Physical Internet is often considered as the
ultimate form of self-organizing logistics, having smart modular containers equipped with sensors
and intelligence able to interact with their surroundings and to route themselves (Van Heeswijk,
Mes, & Schutten, 2019b). Due to the standardized shapes of the containers, they can easily be
combined into full truckloads and be decomposed with equal ease. The concept also suggests that
the system should be able to function without a high degree of central governance, rather converging
to an organically functioning system by itself. Moreover, it is more efficient than traditional logistics
systems, being able to dynamically respond to disruptions and opportunities in the logistics sys-
tem utilizing intelligent decision-making policies. It is this notion of autonomy and self-organizing
systems that inspired the present study.
We model smart containers as independent job agents that – on behalf of their shippers – are
able to place a bid on the transport service that they wish to use. In a dynamic setting, the bid price
should depends on the state of the system. Rather than having the fixed contract prices that preside
in contemporary transport markets, dynamic bidding mimics financial spot markets that constantly
balance demand and supply. For instance, if a warehouse holds relatively few containers waiting for
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transport, a low bid may suffice to get accepted for the transport service, whereas higher bids might
be required during busy times. Additionally, there is also an anticipatory element involved in the
bidding decision. Assuming each container has a given due date, the bidding strategy should also
take into account the probability of future bids getting accepted.
The optimal bidding strategy may be influenced by many factors. We want to have a policy
that provides us with the bid that minimizes expected transport costs given the current state of the
system. Such an optimal policy is very difficult to derive analytically, but may be approximated
by means of reinforcement learning. However, as each job terminates upon delivery of the smart
container, lifespans of individual jobs are very limited. As the quality of a learned bidding policy
to a large extent depends upon the number of observations made, it is therefore difficult to learn
policies individually. Semi-cooperative learning (Boukhtouta, Berger, Powell, & George, 2011) might
alleviate this problem; even though all endeavoring to minimize their own costs rather than striving
towards a common goal, smart containers can share observations to jointly learn better bidding
policies that benefit the individual agents. On the other hand, if competing containers are aware of
the exact bidding strategies of other containers, they may easily be countered. A fully deterministic
policy might therefore not be realistic, we explore whether a stochastic policy yields sensible bidding
decisions. Another question that we seek to answer is whether sharing additional information (other
than bid prices and acceptance) helps in improving bidding policies. System information (e.g., total
container volume in warehouse) may allow for better bids, but the competing containers also utilize
this information for the same purpose.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we explore a setting in which smart containers
may place bids on transport capacity; to the best of our knowledge this topic has not been studied
before from an operations research perspective. In particular, we aim to provide insights into the
drivers that determine the bid price and the effects of information sharing on policy quality. Second,
we present a policy gradient reinforcement learning algorithm to learn stochastic bidding policies,
aiming to mimic a reality in which competing smart containers may deviate from jointly learned
policies. Due to the explorative nature of the paper, we present a simplified problem settings
involving a single transport service with fixed capacity that operates on the real line. The focus is
on the basic mechanisms that govern bidding dynamics absent regulation and centralized control.
2 Literature
This literature overview is structured as follows. First, we discuss the role of smart containers in
the Physical Internet. Second, we highlight several studies on reinforcement learning in the Delivery
Dispatching Problem, which links to our problem from a carrier’s perspective. Third, we discuss
studies that address the topic of bidding in freight transport.
The inspiration from this paper stems from the Physical Internet paradigm. We refer to the
seminal works of Montreuil (Montreuil, 2011; Montreuil, Meller, & Ballot, 2013) for a conceptual
outline of the Physical Internet, thoroughly addressing the foundations of the Physical Internet. It
envisions an open market at which logistics services are offered, stating that (potentially automated)
interactions between smart containers and other constituents of the Physical Internet determine
routing decisions. Sallez et al. (Sallez, Pan, Montreuil, Berger, & Ballot, 2016) stress the active
role that smart containers have, being able to communicate, memorize, negotiate, and learn both
individually and collectively. Ambra et al. (Ambra, Caris, & Macharis, 2019) present a recent
literature review of work performed in the domain of the Physical Internet. Interestingly, their
overview does not mention any paper that defines the smart container itself as the targeted actor.
Instead, existing works seem to focus on traditional actors such as carriers, shippers and logistics
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service providers, even though smart containers supposedly route themselves in the Physical Internet.
The problem studied in this paper is related to the Delivery Dispatching Problem (Minkoff, 1993),
which entails dispatching decisions from a carrier’s perspective. In this problem setting, transport
jobs arrive at a hub according to some external stochastic process. The carrier subsequently decides
which subset of jobs to take, also considering future jobs that arrive according to the stochastic
process. The most basic instances may be solved with queuing models, but more complicated variants
quickly become computationally intractable, such that researchers often resort to reinforcement
learning to learn high-quality policies. We highlight some recent works in this domain. Klapp et
al. (Klapp, Erera, & Toriello, 2018) develop an algorithm that solves the dispatching problem for a
transport service operating on the real line. Van Heeswijk & La Poutre´ (Van Heeswijk & La Poutre´,
2018) compare centralized and decentralized transport for networks with fixed line transport services,
concluding that decentralized planning yields considerable computational benefits. Van Heeswijk et
al. (Van Heeswijk, Mes, & Schutten, 2015, 2019a) study a variant that includes a routing component,
using value function approximation to find policies. Voccia et al. (Voccia, Campbell, & Thomas,
2019) solve a variant that includes both pickups and deliveries.
We highlight some works on optimal bidding in freight transport; most of these studies seem to
adopt a viewpoint in which competing carriers bid on transport jobs. For instance, Yan et al. (Yan,
Ma, Xu, & Ge, 2018) propose a particle swarm optimization algorithm used by carriers to place bids
on jobs. Miller & Nie (Miller & Nie, 2019) present a solution that emphasizes the importance of
integration between carrier competition, routing and bidding. Wang et al. (Wang, Do Nascimento,
& Powell, 2019) design a reinforcement learning algorithm based on knowledge gradients to solve for
a bidding structure with a broker intermediating between carriers and shippers. The broker aims
to propose a price that satisfies both carrier and shipper, taking a percentage of accepted bids as
its reward. In a Physical Internet context, Qiao et al. (Qiao, Pan, & Ballot, 2019) model hubs as
spot freight markets where carriers can place bids on transport bids. To this end, they propose a
dynamic pricing model based on an auction mechanism.
3 Problem definition
This section formally defines our problem in the form of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model.
The model is designed from the perspective of a modular container – denoted as a job j – that aims
to minimize its expected shipping costs over a finite discretized time horizon Tj , with each decision
epoch t ∈ Tj representing a day on which a bid for a capacitated transport service (the carrier) may
be placed. In addition to this job-dependent time horizon, we define a system horizon {0, . . . , T}
with corresponding decision epochs denoted by t′. Thus, we use t when referring to the individual
job level and t′ for the system level.
The cost function and job selection decision of the transport service are defined as well, yet the
transport service agent has no learning capacity. As past bids and transport movements do not
affect current decisions, the Markovian property is satisfied for this problem. Figure 1 illustrates
the bidding problem.
We now define the jobs, with each job representing a modular container that needs to be trans-
ported. A job is represented by the following attribute vector:
j =
jτ = time till due datejd = distance to destination
jv = container volume

The attribute jτ ∈ [0, τmax] ∪ Z indicates how many decision epochs remain until the latest
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Figure 1: Visual representation of the bidding problem. Modular smart containers (jobs) simultane-
ously place bids on a transport service with finite capacity; the bids are accepted or rejected based
on their marginal contributions.
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possible shipment date. When a new job enters the system, we set Tj = {jτ , jτ −1, . . . , 0}; note that
this horizon may differ among jobs and decreases over time; the attribute jτ is decremented with
each time step. When jτ = 0 and the job has not been shipped, it is considered to be a failed job,
incurs a penalty, and is removed from the system. The attribute jd ∈ (0, dmax] ∪ R indicates the
position of the destination on the real line; the further away the higher the transport costs. The job
volume jv ∈ [1, ζmax] ∪ Z indicates how much transport capacity the job requires. Let J t′ be the
problem state, defined as a set containing the jobs present in the system at time t′. Furthermore,
let Jt′ be the set of feasible states at time t′.
At each decision epoch t′, a transport service with fixed capacity C departs along the real line.
For the transport service to decide which jobs to take, the selection procedure is modeled as a 0-1
knapsack problem that is solved using dynamic programming (Kellerer, Pferschy, & Pisinger, 2004).
The value of each job is its bid price minus its transport costs. Jobs with negative values are always
rejected. Note that when the transport capacity exceeds the cumulative job volume, the transport
service will accept all positive bids. The decision vector for the carrier is denoted as γ = [γj ]∀j∈Jt′ ,
with γj ∈ {0, 1}. The set Γ(J t′) denotes the set of all feasible selections. The transport service’s
cost function for shipping a single job j is a function of distance and volume: cj = c
mile · jv · jd. It
maximizes its direct rewards by selecting γt′ as follows:
arg max
γ∈Γ(Jt′ )
∑
j∈Jt′
γj(xj − cj)
 , (1)
s.t. ∑
j∈Jt′
γj · jv < C .
From the perspective of jobs, actions (i.e., bids) are defined on the level of individual containers.
All bids xj ∈ Xj ≡ R are placed in parallel and independent of one another, yielding a vector
x = [xj ]∀j∈Jt′ . Unshipped jobs with jτ > 0 incur holding costs and unshipped jobs with jτ = 0
incur a failed job penalty, both are proportional to the job volume. At any given decision epoch,
the direct reward function for individual jobs is defined as follows:
rj(γj , xj) =

−xj if γj = 1
−chold · jv if jτ > 0 ∧ γj = 0
−cpen · jv if jτ = 0 ∧ γj = 0
To obtain xj at the current decision epoch (which may be denoted by xj ≡ xt′,j when explicitly
including the decision epoch), we try to solve arg maxxt′,j∈Xj
E
(∑t′+|Tj |
t′′=t′ rj(γt′′,j , xt′′,j)
)
, i.e., the goal is to maximize the expected reward (minimize expected
costs) over the horizon of the job. Note that – as a container cannot observe the bids of other jobs,
nor the cost function of the transport service, nor future states – we can only make decisions based
on expected rewards depending on the stochastic environment. The solution method presented in
Section 4 further addresses this problem.
Finally, we define the transition function for the system state that occurs in the time step from
decision epoch t′ to t′+ 1. During this step two changes occur; we (i) decrease the due dates of jobs
that are not shipped or otherwise removed from the system and (ii) add newly arrived jobs to the
state. The set of new jobs arriving for t′ + 1 is defined by J˜ t′+1 ∈ J˜t′+1. The transition function
SM : (J t′ , J˜ t′+1,γ) 7→ J t′+1 is defined by the following sequential procedure:
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Algorithm 1 Transition function SM (J t′ , J˜ t′+1,γt′)
0: Input: Jt′ , J˜t′+1,γt′ I Current state, job arrivals, shipping selection
1: Jt′+1 ←[ ∅ I Initialize next state
2: Jxt′ ←[ Jt′ I Copy state (post-decision state)
3: ∀j ∈ Jt′ I Loop over all jobs
4: Jxt′ ← [ Jxt′ \ j | γt′,j = 1 I Remove shipped job
5: Jxt′ ← [ Jxt′ \ j | jτ = 0 ∧ γt′,j = 0 I Remove unshipped job with due date 0
6: jτ ←[ jτ − 1 | jτ > 0 I Decrement time till due date
7: Jt′+1 ← [ Jxt′ ∪ J˜t′+1 I Merge existing and new job sets
8: Output: Jt′+1 I New state
4 Solution method
To learn the bidding strategy of the containers, we draw from the widely used policy gradient
framework. For a detailed description and theoretical background, we refer to the REINFORCE
algorithm by Williams (Williams, 1992). As noted earlier, the policy gradient algorithm returns a
stochastic bidding policy, reflecting the deviations in bid prices adopted by individual containers.
As bids can take any real value, we must adopt a policy suitable for continuous action spaces. In
this paper we opt for a Gaussian policy, drawing bids from a normal distribution. The mean and
standard deviation of this distribution are learned using reinforcement learning.
In policy-based reinforcement learning, we perform an action directly on the state and ob-
serve the corresponding rewards. Each simulated episode n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} yields a batch of se-
lected actions and related rewards according to the stochastic policy pinθ (xj | j,J t′) = Pθ(xj |
j,J t′). Under our Gaussian policy, bids are drawn independently from other containers, i.e.,
xj ∼ N (µθ(j,J t′), σθ),∀j ∈ J t′ . The randomness in action selection allows the policy to keep
exploring the action space and to escape from local optima. From the observed actions and rewards
during each episode n, we deduce which actions result in above-average rewards and compute gra-
dients ensuring that the policy is updated in that direction, yielding updated policies pin+1θ until we
reach piNθ . For consistent policy updates, we only use observations for jobs that are either shipped
or removed, for which we need some additional notation. Let Kn = [Kn0 , . . . ,K
n
τmax ] be a vector
containing the number of bid observations for such completed jobs. For example, if a job had an
original due date of 4 and is shipped at jτ = 2, we would increment K
n
4 , K
n
3 and K
n
2 by 1 (using
an update function k(j)). Finally, we store all completed jobs (i.e., either shipped or failed) in a set
Jˆ
n
. For each episode, the cumulative rewards per job are defined as follows:
vˆnt,j(γj , xj) =
{
rj(γj , xj) if t = 0
rj(γj , xj) + vˆ
n
t−1,j if t > 0
,∀t ∈ Tj .
Let vˆnt′ =
[
[vˆnt,j ]t∈Tj
]
∀j∈Jt be the vector containing all observed cumulative rewards at time t
′ in
episode n. At the end of each episode, we can then define the information vector
In =
[
[Jnt′ ,x
n
t′ , vˆ
n
t′ ,γ
n
t′ ]∀t′∈{0,...,T},K
n, Jˆ
n
]
and corresponding updating function i(·); the information vector contains the states, actions and
rewards necessary for the policy updates (i.e., a history similar to the well-known SARSA trajectory).
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The decision-making policy is updated according to the policy gradient theorem (Sutton & Barto,
2018), which may be formalized as follows:
∇θvpiθjτ ,j ∝
T∑
t′=1
(∫
Jt′∈Jt′
Ppiθ (J t′ | J t′−1)
∫
xj∈Xj
∇θpiθ(xj | j,J t′)vpiθjτ ,j
)
.
Essentially, the theorem states that the gradient of the objective function is proportional to the value
functions vpiθjτ ,j multiplied by the policy gradients for all actions in each state, given the probability
measure Ppiθ implied by the prevailing decision-making policy piθ.
We proceed to formalize the policy gradient theorem for our problem setting. Let θ be a vector
of weight parameters that defines the decision-making policy piθ : (j,J t′) 7→ Xj . Furthermore, let
φ(j,J t′) be a feature vector that distills the most salient attributes from the problem state, e.g., the
number of jobs waiting to be transported or the average time till due date. We will further discuss
the features in Section 5. For the Gaussian case, we formalize the policy as follows:
piθ =
1√
2piσθ
e
− (xj−µθ(j,Jt′ ))
2
2σ2
θ ,
with xj being the bid price, µθ(j,J t′) = φ(j,J t′)
>θ the Gaussian mean and σθ the parametrized
standard deviation. The action xj may be obtained from the inverse normal distribution. The
corresponding gradients are defined by
∇µθ (j, In) = ∇θ(j, In) = (2)
∇θ log piθ(j, In) = (3)
(xj − µθ(j,J t′))φ(j,J t′)
σ2θ
,
∇σθ (j, In) =
(xj − µθ(j,J t′))2 − σ2θ
σ3θ
.
The gradients are used to update the policy parameters. As the observations may exhibit large
variance, we add a non-biased baseline value (i.e., not directly depending on the policy), namely the
average observed value during the episode (Sutton & Barto, 2018). For the prevailing episode n, we
define the baseline as
v¯nt =
1
Knt
∑
j∈Jˆn
vˆnt,j ,∀t ∈ {0, . . . , τmax} .
For the Gaussian policy, the weight update rule for µθ (updating θ
n−1 to θn) is:
∆µθ (j, I
n) = ∆θ(j, I
n) = (4)
αµ
1
Knjτ
(vˆjτ − v¯jτ )∇θ log piθ(j, In) = (5)
αµ
1
Knjτ
(vˆjτ − v¯jτ )
[
(xj − µθ(j,J t′))φ(j,J t′)
σ2θ
]
. (6)
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The standard deviation σθ is updated as follows:
∆σθ (j, I
n) = ασ
1
Knjτ
(vˆjτ − v¯jτ )∇θ log piθ(j, In) = (7)
ασ
1
Knjτ
(vˆjτ − v¯jτ )
[
(xj − µθ(j,J t′))2 − σ2θ
σ3θ
]
. (8)
Intuitively, this means that after each episode we update the feature weights – which in turn provide
the state-dependent mean bidding price – and the standard deviation of the bids. The mean bidding
price – taking into account both individual job properties and the state of the system – represents
the bid that is expected to minimize overall costs. If effective bids are very close to the mean, the
standard deviation will decrease and the bidding policy will converge to an almost deterministic
policy. However, if there is an expected benefit in varying bids, the standard deviation may grow
larger. The algorithmic outline to update the parametrized policy is at follows:
Algorithm 2 Outline of the policy gradient bidding algorithm (based on (Williams, 1992))
0: Input: pi0θ I Differentiable parametrized policy
1: αµ ← [ (0, 1), ασ ←[ (0, 1) I Set step sizes
2: σ0 ← [ R+ I Initialize standard deviation
3: θ ← [ R|θ| I Initialize policy parameters
4: ∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N} I Loop over episodes
5: Jˆ
n ← [ ∅ I Initialize completed job set
6: In ← [ ∅ I Initialize information set
7: J0 ←[ J0 I Generate initial state
8: ∀t′ ∈ {0, . . . , T} I Loop over finite time horizon
9: xnj ← [ pinθ (j,J t′),∀j ∈ J t′ I Bid placement jobs
10: γn ← [ arg maxγn∈Γ(Jt′ ) I Job selection carrier, Eq. (1)(∑
j∈Jt′ γ
n
j (xj − cj)
)
11: vˆnjτ ,j ← [ rj(γnj , xnj ),∀j ∈ J t′ I Compute cumulative rewards
12: ∀j ∈ J t′ | jτ = 0 ∨ γnj = 1 I Loop over completed jobs
13: Jˆ
n ←[ Jˆn ∪ {j} I Update set of completed jobs
14: Kn ← [ k(j) I Update number of completed jobs
15: In ← [ i(Jnt′ ,xnt′ , vˆnt′ ,γnt′ ,Kn, Jˆn, In) I Store information
16: J˜ t′ ←[ J˜t′ I Generate job arrivals
17: J t′+1 ← [ SM (J t′ , J˜ t′+1,γnt′) I Transition function, Algorithm 1
18: ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , τmax} I Loop till maximum due date
19: ∀j ∈ Jˆn I Loop over completed jobs
20: µn+1θ ←[ µnθ + ∆µθ (j, In) I Update Gaussian mean, Eq. (4)
21: σn+1θ ← [ σnθ + ∆σθ (j, In) I Update standard deviation, Eq. (7)
22: Output: piNθ I Return tuned policy
5 Numerical experiments
This section describes the numerical experiments and the results. Section 5.1 explores the parameter
space and aids in tuning the hyperparameters. The algorithm is written in Python 3.7 and available
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Table 1: Instance settings
Max. # job arrivals [0-10]
Due date [1-5]
Job transport distance [10-100]
Job volume [1-10]
Holding cost (per volume unit) 1
Penalty failed job (per volume unit) 10
Transport costs per mile (per volume unit) 0.1
Transport capacity 80
online.1
5.1 Exploration of parameter space
The purpose of this section is twofold: we explore the effects of various parameter settings on
the performance of the algorithm and select a suitable set of parameters for the remainder of the
experiments. We make use of the instance settings summarized in Table 1. Note that the penalty
for failed jobs is the main driver in determining bid prices; together with holding costs, it intuitively
represents the maximum price the smart container is willing to bid to be transported.
To parametrize the policy we use several features. First, we use a scalar that serves as the bias.
Second, we use the individual job properties of the job placing the bid, i.e., the time till due date, the
job’s transport distance and the container volume. Third, in case the job shares its own properties
with the system, it also use the generic system features: the total number of jobs, average distance,
total volume, and average due date. Recall that these system features only include the data of
other smart containers that share their information. All weight parameters in θ are initialized at 0,
yielding initial bid prices of 0.
We perform a sequential search to set the simulation parameters. First, we tune the learning rates
αµ (learning rate for mean) and ασ (learning rate for standard deviation), starting with a standard
normal distribution. We test learning rates {0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1} for both parameters and find
that αµ = 0.1 and αµ = 0.01 are stable (i.e., no exploding gradients) and converge reasonably fast.
Taking smaller learning rates yields no eminent advantages in terms of stability or eventual policy
quality. Figure 2 shows two examples of parameter convergence under various learning rates.
Next, we tune the initial bias weight θ00 (using values {−50,−40, . . . , 40, 50}) and the initial
standard deviation σ0 (using values {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 25}). Anticipating non-zero bids, we test several
initializations with nonzero bias weights. Large standard deviations allow for much exploration
early on, but may also result in unstable policies or slow convergence. From the experiments, we
observe that the bias weight converges to a small or negative weight and that there is no benefit in
different initializations. For the standard deviation, we find that σ0 = 10 yields the best results; the
exploration triggered by setting large initial standard deviations helps avoiding local optima early
on. In terms of performance, the average transport costs are 7.3% lower than under the standard
normal initialization. Standard deviations ultimately converge to similarly small values regardless
the initialization.
Finally, we determine the number of episodes N and the length of each horizon T . Longer
horizons lead to larger and therefore more reliable batches of completed jobs per episode, but nat-
urally require more computational effort. Thus, we compare settings for which the total num-
1https://github.com/woutervanheeswijk/policygradientsmartcontainers
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(b) αµ = 0.1 and ασ = 0.01
Figure 2: Convergence of µθ and σθ (normalized) for various learning rates. Higher learning rates
achieve both faster convergence and lower average bid prices.
ber of time steps N · T is equivalent. Each alternative simulates 1,000,000 time steps, using
T = {10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000} with corresponding values N . To test convergence, after each
10% of completed training episodes we perform 10 validation episodes – always with T = 1000 for
fair comparisons – to evaluate policy qualities. We find that having large batches provides notable
advantages. Furthermore, in all cases 400,000 time steps appear sufficient to converge to stable
policies. To illustrate the findings, Figure 3a shows the average transport costs measured after each
100,000 time steps (using the then-prevailing policy); Figure 3b shows the quality of the eventual
policies for each time horizon.
The final parameters to be used for the remainder of the numerical experiments are summarized
as follows: N = 4, 000, T = 100, σ0 = 10, αµ = 0.1 and ασ = 0.01.
5.2 Analysis of policy performance
Having determined the parameter settings, we proceed to analyze the performance of the jointly
learned policies. This section addresses the effects of information sharing, the relevance of the
used features in determining the bid, and the behavior of the bidding policy and its impact on
carrier profits. All results in this section correspond to the performance of policies after training is
completed. To obtain additional insights we sometimes define alternative instances; for conciseness
we do not explicitly define the settings of these alternatives.
We first evaluate the effects of information sharing. According to preset ratios, we randomly
assign whether or not a container shares its information with the system. Only containers that
share information are able to see aggregate system information. Clearly, the more containers par-
ticipate, the more accurate the system information will be. We test sharing rates ranging from 0%
to 100% with increments of 10%; Table 2 shows the results. We observe that performance under
full information sharing and no information sharing is almost equivalent, with partial information
sharing always performing worse. The latter observation may be explained by the distorted view
presented by only measuring part of the system state.
In the policy parametrization all features are scaled to the [0, 1] domain, such that the magnitudes
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Figure 3: Policy performance for various time horizons. The horizon T = 100 yields the best overall
performance; batches too small diminish performance.
Table 2: Feature weights for various information sharing rates.
Feature 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Scalar -10.10 -10.28 -8.03 -11.83 -10.98 -4.81 -7.17 -10.46 -8.71 -9.46 -12.12
Total job volume – 0.06 0.06 -0.12 0.44 0.03 0.29 0.42 1.18 0.64 0.63
Average due date – -2.37 -2.73 -3.28 -2.57 -2.73 -2.69 -2.49 -1.79 -2.02 -1.56
Average distance – 1.83 3.07 2.59 2.36 3.18 3.58 3.16 3.44 2.26 2.92
# jobs – -0.03 -0.31 -0.69 -0.21 -0.86 -0.77 -1.39 -0.02 -1.25 -1.70
Job volume 59.20 57.14 56.83 58.46 58.70 55.27 56.13 56.55 56.69 57.97 60.10
Job due date -22.45 -23.25 -24.02 -21.16 -21.95 -23.89 -25.96 -22.89 -22.26 -22.82 -21.27
Job distance 49.49 48.37 45.88 49.38 48.81 45.98 45.27 46.85 48.00 49.15 49.54
Average reward -46.87 -51.78 -55.96 -49.12 -49.54 -57.75 -56.75 -55.71 -53.12 -49.43 -46.32
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(b) Sample paths of bids over time.
Figure 4: Visualizations of bidding policies with respect to volume and due date Bids tend to increase
when (a) transport distance is larger and (b) the job is closer to its due date.
of weights are comparable among each other. We see that the generic features have relatively
little impact on the overall bid price. This underlines the limited difference observed between full
information sharing and no information sharing. Job volume and job distance are by far the most
significant drivers of a job’s bid prices. In line with expectations, as the costs incurred by the carrier
depend on these two factors, therefore requiring higher compensations. Furthermore, holding- and
penalty costs are proportional to the job volume. The relationship with the time till due date is
negative; if more time remains, it might be prudent to place lower bids without an imminent risk
of penalties. On average, each job places 1.36 bids and 99.14% of jobs is ultimately shipped; the
capacity of the transport service is rarely restrictive. Figure 4 illustrates bidding behavior with
respect to transport distance and time till due date, respectively.
Next, we discuss some behavior of the bidding policy and its effect on carrier profits. As our
carrier is a passive agent we omit overly quantitative assessments here. We simulate various toy-sized
instances, adopting simplified deterministic settings with a single container type (time till due date
is zero, identical volume and distance). If transport capacity is guaranteed to suffice, the learned bid
prices converge to almost zero. If two jobs always compete for one transport service and the other
incurs a penalty, the bid will be slightly below the penalty cost. Several other experiments with
scarce capacity also show bid prices slightly below the expected penalty costs that would otherwise
be incurred. For our base scenario, the profit margin for the carrier is 20.2%. This positive margin
indicates that the features do not encapsulate all information required to learn the minimum bidding
price. For comparison, we run another scenario in which the carrier’s transport costs – which are
unknown to the smart containers – are the sole feature; in that case all jobs trivially learn the
minimum bidding price. This result implies that carrier may have financial incentives not to divulge
too much information to the smart containers.
For the carrier, the bidding policies deployed by the smart container greatly influence its profit.
Scarcity of transport capacity drives up bid prices, yet also increases the likelihood of missed revenue.
To gain more insight into this trade-off, we simulate various levels of transport capacity, from
scarce to abundant. These experiment indeed confirm that a (non-trivial) capacity level exists that
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maximizes profit. In addition, a carrier needs not to accept all jobs whose bid exceed their marginal
transport costs, as we presumed in this paper. Having a carrier represented by an active agent
stretches beyond the scope of this paper.
We summarize the main findings, reiterating that the setting of this paper is a highly stylized
environment. The key insights are as follows:
• Utilizing global system information only marginally reduces job’s transport costs compared to
sharing no system information;
• Jointly learned policies converge to stable bidding policies with small standard deviations;
• Jobs with more time remaining till their due date are prone to place lower bids;
• Carriers have an incentive not to disclose true cost information when transport capacity is
abundant.
6 Conclusions
Traditional transport markets rely on (long-term) contracts between shippers and carriers in which
price agreements are made. In contrast, self-organizing systems are expected to evolve into some
form of spot market where demand and supply are dynamically matched based on the current
state of the system. This paper explores the concept of smart containers placing bids on restricted
transport capacity. We design a policy gradient algorithm to mimic joint learning of a bidding policy,
sharing observations between autonomous smart modular containers. The stochastic policy reflects
deviations made by individual containers, given that deterministic policies are easy to counter in a
competitive environment. This stochastic approach appears effective. Standard deviations converge
to small values, implying stable bidding policies. The performance of the policy is consistent with
the effects of job volume, transport distance and till time due date, which are used to parametrize
the bidding policy.
Numerical experiments show that sharing system information only marginally reduces bidding
costs; individual job properties are the main driver in setting bids. The limited difference in policy
quality with and without sharing system information is an interesting observation. This result implies
that smart containers would only need to (anonymously) submit their key properties, submitted bid
prices and incurred costs. There is no apparent need to share information on a system-wide level,
which would greatly ease the system design.
The profitability of the transport service – which is modeled as a passive agent in this paper –
strongly depends on the bidding policy of the smart containers. Experiments with varying transport
capacities show that in turn, the carrier can also influence bidding policies by optimizing the trans-
port capacity that is offered. Without central governance, unbalances between smart containers
and transport services may cause disturbed performances. Based on the findings presented in this
paper, one can imagine that the dynamic interplay between carriers and smart containers is a very
interesting one that begs closer attention.
We re-iterate that this study is of an explorative nature; there are many avenues for follow-
up research. In terms of algorithmic improvements, actor-critic methods (learning functions for
expected downstream values rather than merely observing them) would be a logical continuation.
Furthermore, the linear expression to compute the bidding price could be replaced by neural networks
that capture potential non-linear structures. In addition, the basic problem presented in this paper
lends itself for various extensions. So far the carrier has been assumed to be a passive agent, offering
fixed transport capacity and services regardless of (anticipated) income. In reality the carrier will also
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make intelligent decisions based on the bidding policies of smart containers. A brokerage structure
might also emerge in the Physical Internet context. Finally, we considered only a single transport
service operating on the real line. Using the same algorithmic setup, this setting could be extended
to more realistic networks with multiple carriers, routes and destination nodes.
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